When Worlds Collide – The Evolution of Employment Law Principles in the Termination of Independent Contractor Relationships

It is remarkable how much the law can change in as little as 14 years. In 2005, Justice Kathryn N. Feldman authored reasons for decision on behalf of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the case of 1193430 Ontario Inc. v. Boa-Franc Inc., 2005 CanLII 39862 (ON CA). The essential holding of that case is that, “Employment law concepts such as just cause should not be imported into commercial law context to govern distributorship agreements.”

14 years later, in the case of Barresi v. Jones Lang Lasalle Real Estate Services Inc., 2019 ONCA 884 (CanLII), the two worlds could not be more intertwined.

Discretion to Depart from R.49 Costs Presumption Not Unfettered: ONCA

Does a trial judge have absolute, unfettered discretion in awarding the costs of a proceeding? To what extent does the fact that one of the parties made an offer to settle play a role in fettering the trial judge’s discretion?

In Barresi v. Jones Lang Lasalle Real Estate Services Inc., 2019 ONCA 884, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (Feldman, Fairburn and Jamal JJ.A.) held that, “The discretion to depart from the presumption as to costs in r. 49.10(1) is not unfettered and must be exercised in accordance with the purpose of the rule.” The case thus stands as an important reminder of the import of that rule.

Claiming Constructive Dismissal as an Independent Contractor

Can independent contractors claim damages for constructive dismissal? In a decision released March 7, 2018 by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Barresi v Jones Lang LaSalle Real Estate Services, Inc., 2018 ONSC 837, the answer to that question was essentially yes.

Wrongful Dismissal Cases are Appropriate for Resolution by way of Application: ONSC

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A frequent criticism of the Canadian judicial system is that it moves too slowly. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed in its now infamous decision in R. v. Jordan, [2016] 1 SCR 631, 2016 SCC 27 there has been a “culture of complacency towards delays” in the justice system for years. And while the Supreme Court’s comments were directed towards the criminal system in that case, most would tend to agree that things are no better in the civil bar.

And so what is one to do when he finds himself with a simple, straight-forward wrongful dismissal case, where the only points in issue are: (1) Is this employment contract dispositive of my entitlements to reasonable notice, and (2) If the answer to that question is no, then what is the notice period?

Prevailing wisdom over the past seven or so years has been that the dismissed party should start an action, and then bring a motion for summary judgment. (See the comments of Justice Hackland in Beatty v. Best Theratronics Ltd., 2014 ONSC 3376 (CanLII): I agree with Perell J.’s observation in Adjemian v. Brook Crompton North America, [2008] O.J. No. 2238 (Ont. S.C.J.) that summary judgment may be an appropriate and optimal way to proceed in cases involving the determination of reasonable notice periods.)

But, as will be considered below, motions for summary judgment, especially in cases where the amount claimed is less than $100,000, can have their drawbacks and limitations.

Is there a better way yet still?

I believe there is. And, in the case of Farah v EODC Inc., 2017 ONSC 3948 (CanLII), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice endorsed such an approach as appropriate.

Divisional Court Rules that Employees May Sometimes be Required to Attend Medical Examination by Doctor of Employer’s Choosing

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Is an employee required to submit to an independent medical examination, an “IME”, by a doctor of his employer’s choosing as part of the employee’s duty to participate in the human rights accommodation process? In a decision released May 19, 2017, by the Ontario Divisional Court, Bottiglia v Ottawa Catholic School Board, 2017 ONSC 2517, the answer was “sometimes.”

Employers Can Terminate Probationary Employees Without Cause

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Can an employer terminate the employment of an employee on probation without cause? That was the fundamental question that the Ontario Divisional Court had to answer in the case of Barton v. Bowerman, unreported, Divisional Court File No. 16-DC-2178 (Ottawa.)

In an earlier post, An employer can only dismiss a probationary employee for just cause” – Why that statement may have been correct, but it doesn’t mean what you think, I wrote about what it means to be on probation and the statement in the case of Mison v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 1994 CanLII 7383 (ON SC) that, “… an employer can only dismiss a probationary employee for just cause.”

In that earlier post, I wrote the following with respect to the termination of a probationary employee:

First, it is clear, settled law that a provincially regulated employer requires neither just cause nor even reason to terminate the employment of an employee who is not on probation. Meaning that those employees who either (a) are not placed on probation, see my next point below, or (b) ‘survive’ the probationary period, most certainly can be terminated without cause or reason.

Second, the placement of an employee on probation is wholly at the discretion of the employer; there is no automatic probationary period.

Third, the act of placing an employee “on probation” cannot possibly elevate the employee’s rights; that would be antithetical to the point.

So if all of those points are legally correct, and I would submit that they are, then why is an employer required to demonstrate just cause to terminate the employment of a probationary employee at all? Sure, it’s a modified test under Mison, but still, what is the legal basis for requiring an employer to show fairness to employee to whom it has arguably provided more notice of an intention to ‘fire at will’ than one to whom it has not? It simply makes no sense to me.

I then asked for comments on the issue of probation, and Professor David Doorey of Osgoode Hall Law School wrote the following:

I'd argue that a probationary clause does not oust the right of employer to terminate with notice, without alleging that termination is for cause. But once employer asserts termination is due to unfitness or failure to meet performance standards, a probationary clause allows court to assess the employer's decision on a low threshold standard of review (did employer fairly evaluate, give employee a reasonable chance, not act in bad faith, etc). The probationary clause introduces a lower standard of cause for employers who want to avoid notice and rely on summary dismissal. Having said that, if a probationary employee is terminated while a probationary clause is still in effect, a court may presume that the termination was due to performance or unfitness and consider the employer's decision in any event. Since notice period for a probationary employee would always be very short, at least if the contract requires only ESA minimum notice, I've never understand the value to an employer of including a probationary clause. If the probationary period is less than 3 months, no notice is required under ESA, if 3-12 months, it is one week's notice. Why not just give the notice and be done with it?

What Professor Doorey did not know at the time was that his position was exactly what I intended to argue before the Divisional Court and on November 30, 2016, I did make exactly that argument.

So are we right?

“An employer can only dismiss a probationary employee for just cause” – Why that statement may have been correct, but it doesn’t mean what you think.

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Does an employer require “just cause” to terminate the employment of an employee “on probation”? For the reasons that will follow, I would submit that, in Ontario, provided that the employer is provincially regulated, they do not.

I agree that my position would appear to stand at odds with the following statement made by the Honourable Justice Epstein in Mison v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 1994 CanLII 7383 (ON SC):

[43] … an employer can only dismiss a probationary employee for just cause.

Stay with me, this is about to get complicated.

Judge Orders Costs of Injunction against Solicitation “In the Cause”

The dirty secret of contract law is that a contract is only as good as a party’s ability to enforce it. Typically, this blog focuses on the legal ability of an employer to enforce certain elements of an employment contract; whether that element be termination provisions, about which I write frequently, or restrictive covenants, such as non-solicitation or non-competition agreements, about which I write much less frequently.

Putting legal considerations aside for a moment, there are also practical considerations in attempting to enforce contractual provisions, not the least of which is the element of cost.

In his reasons for decision in Accreditation Canada International v Guerra, 2016 ONSC 6184, the Honourable Justice Patrick Smith of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice sitting at Ottawa, highlights one of the main practical impediments to an employer attempting to enforce restrictive covenants: the cost.

Ontario Small Claims Court Judge Awards $8,000 in Costs Against Unsuccessful Wrongful Dismissal Claimant

One of the most commonly held beliefs about the civil justice system is that the losing party has to pay the winning party’s legal fees. While that belief is not entirely correct, it is not entirely wrong either.

Civil courts in Ontario have the right to award “costs” following a “proceeding.” Without wading too far into the semantics, “costs” is not the same thing as the amount that one has paid his or her lawyer, and “a proceeding” may be a trial, but it may also be something else.

The issue of costs in the Ontario Small Claims Court is both more simple and more complex. What makes matters easier is that the law prescribes that the basic amount of costs to which a successful party will be entitled following a trial is 15% of the amount claimed, plus actual disbursements. With a jurisdictional limit of $25,000, that means that if one sues for $25,000, then costs may typically be in the range of $3,750, i.e. 15% of the amount claimed.

Where things get complicated is that the law also says that judges have discretion to award more or less money for costs. The law also allows the judge to award costs to the losing party.

Decisions on costs from the Ontario Small Claims Court are rare. Judges rarely issue written reasons for the costs award, and even when judges do write out their reasons they are infrequently reported.

In 2015, I was involved in a Small Claims matter where the plaintiff alleged that she was wrongfully dismissed. I acted for the defendants in that case. On January 1, 2016, the Honourable Deputy Judge Lyon Gilbert dismissed the plaintiff’s case for reasons reported as Barton v Bowerman, 2016 CanLII 30100 (ON SCSM). Following the trial the judge invited the parties to make submissions on the amount of costs that should be awarded.

Following the presentation of written submissions, Deputy Judge Gilbert awarded the defendants, for whom I acted, $8,000.00 in costs. The court’s reasons can be found by clicking the following link: Costs Decision in Barton v Bowerman. Ottawa Small Claims Court. Court File No. 14-SC-130470. January 18, 2016.

HRTO Declines to Punish Employer who Breached Terms of Settlement

What is the penalty or punishment for failing to honour the terms of settlement entered into in an Ontario Human Rights case?

Like most things in law, the answer is “it depends.” However, as the case of Inman v. Seniors on Site, 2016 HRTO 723 demonstrates, sometimes people can break their word, break a written contract, and seemingly get away with it.

ONSC Awards Four Months Notice to Employee With Less Than One Year of Service

What is the appropriate notice period for an employee dismissed after less than one year of employment? While the answer will always be “it depends,” in a decision released today by the Honourable Justice Catherine D. Aitken of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice sitting at Ottawa, Wellman v. The Herjavec Group Inc., 2014 ONSC 2039 (CanLII), the reasonable period for an employee who had worked for only 51 weeks was found to be four months.